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I went to the University of Toronto in the fall of 1983 to pursue a Master’s 
Degree in what was then called Political Economy. I chose Toronto largely 
because C.B. Macpherson taught there. Or so I thought. In those pre- 
internet days, news traveled slowly, and while the brochure I had received 
in the mail clearly listed him as a member of the faculty, I discovered when 
I arrived that he had in fact retired.
As it happens, his physical absence hardly seemed to matter, as his 
ideas—along with those of Allan Bloom, who was also no longer there—
permeated the air. It was easy to think about and find discussions of not 
just Possessive Individualism, but also of his many essays on democratic 
theory. When, after a four year absence in the mid-80s, I returned for doc-
toral work, I found no small amount of faculty support for a dissertation on 
Macpherson’s democratic vision.
I mention this history because it is of a time that now seems quite remote. 
Good old-fashion Marxist inspired leftism has almost a quaint air about 
it, as the names of those whose works we debated endlessly—Miliband, 
Poulantzas, Althusser, Marcuse (a friend of Macpherson’s), Fromm—now 
create more nostalgia than they do internecine graduate student fighting. 
So too does the name Macpherson, and, I would argue, we need, in mark-
ing the 50th anniversary of Possessive Individualism, to acknowledge that 
fact. The book is fifty years old, but it was really only alive for about half of 
that time. Part of the explanation for its decline is no doubt found in the 
critiques—by Dunn, Skinner and others—of Macpherson’s interpretations 
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of Hobbes, Locke et al.1 Of at least equal significance, however, are the forces 
that have undermined enthusiasm for much of the socialist left. Put simply: 
Macpherson was too forceful a critic of capitalism for his work to remain 
unscathed by that system’s perceived triumph over communism.
Or so I shall argue. When I say “too forceful” I do not mean to imply that 
Macpherson’s critique of capitalism was where he went wrong. Actually, 
I intend to make precisely the opposite point. To be more specific, my argu-
ment here is that while the central ethical commitment of the theory of 
possessive individualism was anti-capitalist in nature—and for that reason 
a difficult sell in today’s political climate—a close inspection of the manner 
in which Macpherson employed that commitment 
reveals a critical perspective that renders his work 
every bit as vital now as it was thirty, forty or fifty 
years ago.2
I.
Macpherson explained in the opening pages of 
 Possessive Individualism that the book’s central 
 concept is a form of individualism arising in the 
seventeenth-century in which the individual is “seen 
as essentially the proprietor of his own person or 
capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”3 This 
image was, Macpherson argued, brought to life in 
the writings of liberal thinkers who took their cues 
about the nature of individuals from the nascent 
capitalist relations around them.4 In imbuing their 
theories with this image, they managed, as have 
their successors—and in Macpherson’s hands, there is no shortage of pos-
sessive individualists—to in turn justify those relations, for capitalism as an 
ideal made sense only as long as humans were conceived in the possessive 
individualist mode (which, as he later commented, was “a fairly realistic 
conclusion at the time”5).
The logic of these justifications made them unassailable to anyone 
 unwilling to question the basic “postulates of human nature,” as Macpherson 
was fond of calling them. And for those who did question them—J.S. 
Mill and T.H. Green through to twentieth century liberals such as A. D. 
Lindsay and Ernest Barker—the results were various forms of contradiction 
Hobbes, Locke, 
and others 
whose theories 
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with possessive 
individualist 
assumptions . . . 
interested him 
for the part they 
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“involving the thinkers’ concealing from themselves the fundamental nature 
of the problem.”6 As the possessive individualism postulates could not be 
jettisoned “while market relations prevail,”7 critics of the possessive model 
simply tacked on to them an “egalitarian complement.”8 This “concept of 
man as at least potentially a doer, an exerter and developer and enjoyer 
of his human capacities”9 resulted in “an uneasy compromise between 
the two views of man’s essence, and, correspondingly, an unsure mixture 
of  .  .  . two maximizing claims made for the liberal-democratic society.”10 
Thus while the theory of possessive individualism was initially an attempt 
to bring to light the pervasiveness in liberal theory of market assumptions 
about humans, it became, as Macpherson continued in subsequent works to 
explore its normative implications,11 an attempt to expose much broader and 
further reaching contradictions within what had become liberal- democratic 
theory. As he put it, “Because Western democratic theory contains these 
inconsistent postulates, its condition is internally precarious.”12
So far there is little to indicate why this theory might have come to 
be neglected in the last twenty years. Even if Macpherson’s critics were 
correct that early liberal thinkers were not drawing from nascent market 
relations in their postulates about human nature, none, to my knowledge, 
has suggested that these postulates are absent in their theories. (Rousseau, 
after all, had argued something very similar when he pointed out that all 
state of nature theorists, “speaking continually of need, avarice, oppres-
sion, desires, and pride, have transferred to the state of nature the ideas 
they acquired in society.”13) Nor has there been criticism of the claim that 
such postulates do indeed work to justify market relations (irrespective 
of whether that justification was the intention of any particular thinker). 
In fact, it is difficult to see how one could reject that claim. So what is the 
problem here? Why is the theory of possessive individualism not still in 
currency?
The answer, I think, has far less to do with Macpherson’s analysis of 
liberal-democratic theories than it does with the normative position that 
motivated it. He was, after all, targeting those theories not simply because 
he, like Rousseau, saw them as anthropologically or ontologically incorrect. 
Rather, he targeted them because of what they did, namely justify particu-
lar inequalities endemic to market relations.14 Hobbes, Locke, and others 
whose theories were imbued with possessive individualist assumptions did 
not interest him as subjects of intellectual history; they interested him for 
the part they played—wittingly or not—in the justification of unjust prop-
erty relations. His general thinking was that
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the maintenance [of any particular system of property] requires at least 
the acquiescence of the bulk of the people, and the positive support of 
any leading classes. Such support requires a belief that the institution 
serves some purpose or fills some need. That belief requires, in turn, 
that there be a theory which both explains and justifies the institution 
in terms of the purpose served or the need filled.15
This, then, was the role of possessive individualist theories.
So what unjust set of property relations—what institution—did pos-
sessive individualism explain and justify? In discussing possessive indi-
vidualism’s emphasis on humans as having unlimited desires, Macpherson 
followed a causal chain to the source of the problem:
. . . the acceptance, by the most active part of 
society, of the belief that unlimited desire is 
natural and rational leads to the establishment 
of the right of unlimited appropriation, which 
leads to the concentration of ownership of the 
material means of labour, which leads to the 
continual transfer of powers.16
This continual transfer occurs because men, as “pro-
prietors of their own person or capacities,” are able to 
“sell the use of their energy and skill on the market, in 
exchange for the product or the use of others’ energy 
and skill.”17 The source of the injustice was, then, the 
wage relationship, a relationship made possible by “the individual right to 
unlimited, or virtually unlimited, accumulations of property.”18 Possessive 
Individualism (the book) did not dwell long on these concrete conditions, as 
Macpherson’s focus was on the possessive picture of humanity that emerges 
from Hobbes, et al. He did, however, in his discussion of Hobbes, outline the 
features of “possessive market society,” emphasizing that “if a single criterion 
of [this] society is wanted it is that man’s labour is a commodity.”19 Indeed, 
this criterion makes this possessive “model of society” the only one (of three 
he described) that “meet(s) Hobbes’s requirements:”
Only in a society in which each man’s capacity to labour is his own 
property, is alienable, and is a market commodity, could all individuals 
be in this continual competitive power relationship.20
The “possessive” 
in “possessive 
individualism” 
refers not to our 
relationship with 
commodities . . . 
but rather to our 
relationship with 
our own labor.
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To sum up: the “possessive” in “possessive individualism” refers not to 
our relationship with commodities (as is commonly supposed),21 but rather 
to our relationship with our own labor. Specifically, it refers to the fact that 
we can have a relationship with it; that it is thought of not as “us” but rather 
as “ours.” (Try having a relationship with your leg.) This self-image—the 
product of possessive individualist theories—in turn allows us to accept 
the sale of labor to others, and it is this actual, concrete economic fact (the 
 existence of the wage relationship) that lies at the core of Macpherson’s 
 critical analysis. It is also what makes that analysis problematic in the era 
that accepts the market in an increasingly uncritical fashion, for in attack-
ing the commodification of labor, the theory of possessive individualism 
attacks the market at its core.
II.
In most of Macpherson’s analysis of possessive individualism, Marx is not 
mentioned. In fact Marx’s name only appears on two pages of Possessive 
Individualism. Yet, as he makes clear on one of those two pages, his debt is 
substantial:
The conception of possessive market society is neither a novel nor an 
arbitrary construction. It is clearly similar to the concepts of bourgeois 
or capitalist society used by Marx, Weber, Sombart, and  others, who 
have made the existence of a market in labour a criterion of  capitalism.22
Indeed, while Macpherson did in subsequent writings say a bit more about 
the concrete economic relations he viewed as unjust, he never actually 
refined or added to Marx’s analysis; he simply appropriated it as his own.23 
Whatever debt he owed “Weber, Sombart, and others” was never again 
mentioned. Marx, however, remained a steady, if often unmentioned, voice 
in his later writings. Irrespective of whether he himself was at some level 
a Marxist—an issue I have always found uninteresting, if not silly24—he 
clearly felt, as he once quipped, that “the utility of Marxism as a means of 
understanding the world is increasing over time.”25
I highlight Macpherson’s embracing of Marx’s social analysis in order 
to identify a crucial difference between the two. If Macpherson’s social 
analysis was the same as Marx’s, the conceptual framework in which it was 
delivered was emphatically not, and, as I shall suggest, it is precisely this 
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perspectival difference that explains why the utility of Marxism as a means 
of  understanding the world has not increased over time, and why the utility 
of possessive individualism need not follow the same path. To see this point, 
we need to contrast the language each thinker used in discussing what, pre-
cisely, was the problem raised by the wage relationship. We turn first to Marx.
Marx’s first sustained analysis of the wage relationship is found in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where he describes the 
problem of that relationship as one of “alienation.” In the essay “Estranged 
Labor,” he identifies four particular types of alienation: from the laboring 
process, from the object of labor, from our “Species Being” and from each 
other. The first thing to note in this account is how at least half of it rests 
on some fairly ambiguous conceptual arguments. Whether we are alienated 
from our Species Being will, of course, depend on what that is; an issue that 
can hardly be resolved in the absence of some deep ontological claim. As far 
as being alienated from our fellow human beings, 
it is difficult to see how social separation—though 
regrettable  morally—could, despite its effects on the 
individual, be constituted as a wrong in some polit-
ical sense: if it is “wrong,” it is so only in a broad 
sense that would be difficult to defend uncontrover-
sially (“life shouldn’t be like that”). At a minimum it 
seems unlikely that we can point, say, to any right (to 
 fraternity?) being violated.
What, however, of alienation from the laboring 
process and the product of our labor? How is the 
essence of the problem described there? On the 
laboring process, Marx’s language is particularly striking (and should draw 
comparisons to Macpherson’s):
. . . labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential 
being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies 
himself, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but 
mortifies his body and ruins his mind. He is at home when he is not 
working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is there-
fore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to 
it  . . . Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in 
the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong 
to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another . . .26
In attacking the 
commodification 
of labor, the theory 
of possessive 
individualism 
attacks the market 
at its core.
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Here alienation results in a condition of, as Wood has put it, “a person who 
experiences life as empty, meaningless and absurd, or who fails to sustain a 
sense of self-worth.”27 Troublesome as well is what the laborer creates:
The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer 
belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the 
greater is the worker’s lack of objects. Whatever the product of his 
labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he 
 himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means . . . that the 
life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something 
 hostile and alien.28
Again, the condition seems problematic, although it is difficult to know 
how to characterize what is problematic about it. Is it that we fail to remain 
attached to our deeper, ontological self  ? And what is 
that? With respect to the products the laborer pro-
duces, how precisely is he harmed in not being able 
to see himself in them?
I am not suggesting that there exist no wrongs 
here, only that one’s capacity to conceptualize them 
as Marx did seems contingent upon acceptance of 
certain antecedent ontological claims.29 In some 
sense, this difficulty gets us to the heart of Marx’s 
project. To translate the problem with wage labor 
into one of injustice, where rights of the laborer are 
violated, is to miss Marx’s larger message that talk of justice and rights is 
hopelessly parochial, bound as it is to the very relations of production we 
wish to call into question.30 Indeed, given that our conceptual understand-
ing of justice and rights is, in his mind, the product of those relations, Marx 
might have questioned even our ability to perceive the wage relation as an 
injustice or a violation of rights.
At first glance, this claim seems similar to Macpherson’s argument about 
the obscuring effects of possessive individualism. The difference, however, 
is that Macpherson’s claims about liberal theory were divorced from a larger 
theory of history. He was largely agnostic on the issue of how deeply tied 
justificatory theory was to its material foundations. “I do not enter into the 
general question of the primacy of ideas or material conditions,”31 he pro-
nounced. Yes, Hobbes and Locke could be explained by the milieu in which 
they wrote, but so too could Mill and Green. If the formers’ theories were 
Macpherson 
decoupled 
liberalism from 
the relations 
of production 
to which he so 
objected.
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merely “ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process,”32 the latters’ 
were proof that liberalism was not merely another moment in capitalist’s 
epiphenomenal orbit. Marx spilled much ink—and more bile—decrying 
Mill’s “shallow syncretism;”33 Macpherson, on the other hand, extolled his 
ability to break free from the narrow confines of possessive thinking.
The difference, then, is that Macpherson decoupled liberalism from the 
relations of production to which he so objected. His project was one of 
“retrieval,” as he put it, not dismissal, a point he makes clear in the opening 
pages of Possessive Individualism. If we are blinded by some  liberalisms, 
others might restore our sight. Whether he was “right” in some absolute 
sense—whether we can indeed see and critique the relations of production 
from some independent standpoint—is beside the point. What  matters only 
is that Macpherson’s critique is one that still has force in an era  reluctant 
to look beyond the realities of liberal individualism. Requiring no contro-
versial ontological claims, Macpherson asks only that we view relations 
of production from individualistic ideals spawned in their lifetime. More 
pointedly, he asks whether those relations might actively subvert the very 
ideals used to justify them.
In Possessive Individualism, Macpherson’s principal critique of the mar-
ket was that by the twentieth century it had destroyed both the equality and 
cohesion of interests that were the sine quo nons of political obligation.34 
The problem was that “liberal theory must continue to use the assump-
tions of possessive individualism because they are factually accurate for 
our possessive market societies.”35 Moreover, the market posed no inher-
ent contradiction to the assumptions; indeed it vindicated the only sort of 
freedom of which possessive individuals were capable. Liberals such as Mill 
who rejected possessive assumptions as “morally offensive”36 were thereby 
doomed to toil in unreality.
As Macpherson continued to work on problems in liberal-democratic 
theory over the next twenty-five years, he expanded his understanding of 
its internal contradictions beyond the issue of obligation. The problem 
remained liberal-democratic theory’s “attempt to carry into the period of 
mature capitalist society a combination of market postulates and egali-
tarian humanist principles which were not strictly tenable together even 
when first compounded a century or more ago.”37 Yet what made the com-
bination untenable was not simply that obligation was precluded, but that 
one set of postulates (the possessive individualist ones) worked to justify 
an economic system that contradicted the other (the egalitarian human-
ist principles). The market simply cannot generate a society of “doers 
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and creaters.” Hence, the inclusion of the latter postulates had rendered 
 liberal-democratic  theory self-contradictory.
We see, then, that while Marx’s claim is that the capitalist  market contra-
dicts larger concerns about a higher nature of humanity and human  relations, 
Macpherson saw no need to abandon the basic  liberal- democratic ideals that 
were “introduced into predemocratic liberal theory in the  nineteenth  century 
to make it liberal-democratic.”38 To Marx’s claim that the system would col-
lapse under the weight of its internal  structural  contradictions— falling rates 
of profit, proletarianization,  concentration of capital—Macpherson argued 
that the contradiction was between a  functioning market system and the ide-
als of human life understood on its own terms. Put simply: Marx rose above 
liberalism, Macpherson stayed within it.
III.
Let me be clear about why this last distinction matters. I am making no 
claims here about the ontological adequacy of either Marxism or liberalism. 
In truth, I have always been drawn to the implications of Marx’s analysis 
of  alienation—to the very ideas that I earlier suggested were ambiguous 
and reliant on controversial ontological claims.39 What I have always found 
appealing about Macpherson, however, was his determination to  liberalize 
those claims. As a first rate historian of political thought, Macpherson 
taught his readers that there was within the liberal tradition a rich vision 
of human life, one that held much of the appeal of Marx’s40 (and that was 
in fact “fundamentally the same as the Marxian concept”41), but one that 
also avoided the political ramifications that came with Marx’s correspond-
ing theory of history. In short, Macpherson’s critique of the wage relation-
ship demonstrated that “revisionism” need not accept the baggage with 
which Marx had laden it. Seen through a wide enough historical lens, one 
that looked beyond its possessive moments, liberalism could offer a vision 
expansive enough to challenge the wage relationship, and it could do so 
using the market’s own analytic framework.
The advantage of Macpherson’s perspective is plain: to engage in debate 
over the wage relationship without recourse to justice or a concern for 
rights is to argue at cross paths with one’s antagonists, all the more so in 
the past twenty years. Even if Marx is correct that, “liberty as a right of man 
is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separa-
tion of man from man,”42 it would still be important to question whether 
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the capitalist market is really the most effective means to protect its own 
conception of rights and to realize its own understanding of justice. Thus, 
to ground a critique of property rights in the claim that “the rights of any 
man which are morally justifiable . . . are only those which allow all others 
to have equal effective rights”43 is to point out that property rights must at 
a minimum be justifiable on basic liberal principles. Macpherson’s demon-
stration that rights derived from possessive postulates could not rise even 
to this challenge allowed him to arrive at a position both radical and liberal. 
Rather than overcoming liberalism, Macpherson contested its meaning:
A liberal position need not be taken to depend forever on an accept-
ance of capitalist assumptions, although historically it has been so 
taken. The fact that liberal values grew up in capitalist market societies 
is not in itself a reason why the central ethical principle of liberalism—
the freedom of the individual to realize his or her human capacities—
need always be confined to such societies.44
In Macpherson’s hands, then, the transcen-
dence of capitalism could occur on liberal terms; 
terms that emphasized the importance of both 
civil  liberties45 and human rights. As long as lib-
eralism was viewed from the proper historical 
 perspective—as “an assertion of the right to all to 
full human   development”46—it alone could reveal 
the inadequacies of the market system.
IV.
So how, then, does the wage relation pose contradictions for liberalism? In 
what way is a “fully human life” subverted by a productive process in which 
laborers play no part in deciding what is produced, when it is produced, 
how it is produced or why it is produced? The salient moral issue is not the 
distribution of the means of production, as it is, for instance, in the analytic 
critiques of Roemer47 and Arneson.48 The issue, rather, is with respect to the 
effect that distribution has on the participants in the productive process. 
Macpherson was particularly concerned about the effects on two institu-
tions crucial to the liberal ideal: those of democracy and those of property. 
I shall close by examining how the wage relation undermines each one.
Marx rose 
above liberalism, 
Macpherson stayed 
within it.
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First democracy. We can begin with democracy in its most generic sense, 
something akin to Dewey’s claim that it “consists in having a responsible 
share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the 
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the 
values which the groups sustain.”49 While this understanding of democ-
racy highlights the potential conflict between the wage relationship and 
democratic principles, it also points to a number of ways in which the two 
might have little or no bearing on one another. Suggesting conflict is the 
idea that the laborer, insofar as he or she belongs to the productive process, 
should have a responsible share in forming and directing the activities of 
that process. The same words also point to reasons for being wary of see-
ing conflict, however, for skeptics could ask: In what sense does the laborer 
“belong” to the productive process? Moreover, there is the issue of whether 
a “ responsible” share is necessarily inconsistent with an unequal one.
Both issues point to the fact that the applicability of democratic prin-
ciples rests on how we might adjudicate prior questions about the nature of 
the productive process, for the imposition of the democratic lens has nor-
mative force only if we accept the prior claim that the productive process 
should be democratic. (The claim, for example, that family relations do not 
meet with democratic standards is more of an observation than a norma-
tive critique.) In short, we need first to determine the extent to which the 
productive process is similar to or different from the society that Dewey, 
among  others, had in mind.
In Macpherson’s hands such concerns are quickly brushed aside, for 
boundaries between democratic and non-democratic realms are blurred, 
if not torn asunder. In an essay written twenty years before Possessive 
Individualism, Macpherson argued that,
If we think of democracy as not merely a set of institutions . . . but as 
a set of purposes or ends to which these institutions are but means, 
it is surely legitimate to hold that any other institutions, including 
economic ones, which can be shown to be also essential means to the 
democratic ends are equally entitled to the shelter and support of the 
word democracy.50
The idea that democracy was not merely a political concept but a broader 
social one (a “normatively structured way of life” as John Keane described it51), 
remained at the heart of Macpherson’s thought until his death. So too did the 
claim that democracy was not just about “having a responsible share accord-
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ing to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which 
one belongs” but also that it involved “moving towards a firmly-held goal of 
an equal society in which everybody can be fully human,”52 or, as he later for-
mulated it, in which there was an “equal opportunity to use and develop and 
enjoy whatever capacities each person has.”53 Indeed, it is this broader concep-
tion of democracy’s meaning that explains Macpherson’s insistence on looking 
beyond political institutions.54 If the goal is to be fully human, then (assuming 
democratic control as seen as an integral aspect of that goal), the activities over 
which one needs control would necessarily encompass the whole of one’s life.
To go even further, the activities of particular importance will be those 
that get to the heart of “doing” and “creating;” namely those surrounding 
our productive, laboring lives. In discussing movements for the democratic 
participation in decision making in the workplace, Macpherson captured 
what was at stake:
Those involved in workers’ control are participating as producers, not as 
consumers or appropriators. They are in it not to get a higher wage or 
a greater share of the product, but to make their productive work more 
meaningful to them. If workers’ control were merely another move in 
the scramble for more pay to take home . . . it would do nothing . . . 
to move men away from their image of themselves as consumers and 
appropriators. But workers’ control is not primarily about distribution 
of income: it is about the conditions of production . . .55
Whether empirically true or not, the statement speaks to Macpherson’s 
(and Marx’s) central claim that how we produce is of vital importance to 
the way in which we conceive of ourselves, (and, ultimately, who we are). 
Far from being a controversial ontological claim, the insight here relies only 
on the observation that labor is, in fact, a part of us (and that it is only in 
light of an historical turn in seventeenth century liberal thought that we 
have come to think otherwise). From that perspective it is the wage relation-
ship that reflects and embodies an ontological mistake (or at a minimum, an 
extremely controversial claim), one whose correction requires a democratic 
ideal that, in calling for a fully human existence, insists upon the return of 
what the capitalist market structure has taken:
Now there can be no doubt that democratic control is incompatible 
with the corporate freedoms that are needed for maximum capital 
 accumulation. Capital has every reason, for the sake of its own  liberties, 
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to resist democratic control. An unlimited property right cannot 
 co-exist with democracy.56
In subjecting the wage relation to a democratic litmus test, Macpherson 
saw as the task not to overthrow the market, but only to rein in its anti-
democratic effects. What mattered was the degree to which, to alter Dewey 
slightly, “the laborer has a responsible share according to capacity in forming 
and directing the activities of the productive groups to which he belongs.” 
Whether that share is received will depend not on the existence (or lack 
thereof) of the wage relation, but on its terms. Moreover, any advances 
toward the democratic ideal would themselves depend upon a democratic 
process, one that hinged as much on advances in public perception as it did 
on any underlying structural change. As Macpherson put it: “the possibil-
ity of a genuinely participatory democracy emerging 
in Western liberal-democratic states varies inversely 
with their electorates’ acceptance . . . of the posses-
sive individualist model of man.”57
The wage relationship was not simply a demo-
cratic problem, for the inequality of access to the 
means of labor that it entailed “also contradict[ed] 
one of the basic justifications of the . . . institution of 
individual property, namely, that human needs can-
not be met without that institution.”58 In his writings 
on property, Macpherson began with the concept 
in its broadest sense, one that abstracted away from 
any particular mode of production. At this level, 
property is, in Tawney’s words, “a moral right, and 
not merely a legal right, because it insures that the producer will not be 
deprived by violence of the result of his efforts.”59 What market society had 
done, via the wage relation, was to sever this all-important link between 
labor and its fruits. As such, its very rationale (which was, as Green put it, 
“that everyone should be secured by society in the power of getting and 
keeping the means of realizing a will”60) had been undermined.
In response, Macpherson worked to reconnect readers to conceptions 
of property that the market and its justifying theories had occluded:61
The validity of the case for property as a necessary human right 
depends . . . on whether we take property in the modern narrow sense, 
or in the more extended and more natural sense of an individual right 
Critics of the 
market, if we are 
to hear them at all, 
must demonstrate 
that market 
property rights will 
not get us where 
we want to go . . . 
as liberals.
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both to some exclusive property and to some non-exclusive right of 
access to the remaining natural resources and the accumulated capital 
of a given society. If we continue to take it in the modern narrow sense, 
the property right contradicts democratic human rights. If we take it 
in the broader sense, it does not contradict a democratic concept of 
human rights: indeed it may bring us back to something like the old 
concept of individual property in one’s life, liberty, and capacities.62
Elsewhere, he was more specific:
As soon as a property in things is derived from an exclusive right which 
is at the same time an alienable right, i.e., the right to or property in 
one’s labour, the damage is done: property as a right needed by all to 
enable them to express their human essence is denied to many.63
In short, certain forms of property are consistent with the ideal of the insti-
tution itself and certain forms are not. In adopting the latter forms, market 
societies not only lose sight of property’s fundamental meaning, they also 
abandon the very principles upon which they were built.
V.
Again, I have no wish to promote Macpherson at the expense of Marx. 
As I have suggested, most of these arguments are wholly consistent with 
Marx’s  thinking. Like Macpherson, Marx sought to salvage property, not 
to destroy it (“that there can be no production and hence no society where 
some form of property does not exist is a tautology”64), he did so by taking 
aim at its most recent form (“the distinguishing feature of Communism 
is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois 
property”65), and he did so on exactly the same grounds as Macpherson 
(“[c]ommunism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products 
of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the 
labour of others by means of such appropriation66).
The problem of Marx has less to do with the substance of his message 
than it does with its ability to be heard. And yet, critiques of the market 
are as vital now as they were in 1962, or, for that matter, 1862. Perhaps more 
so. Environmental degradation, growing income inequality, high rates of 
unemployment and, for those who do have jobs, a steady erosion of labor 
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rights all provide adequate evidence, for those who care to listen, that the 
market’s “triumph” is a hollow one. The question is who will care to listen. 
Or, more to the point: to whom will they listen?
Critics of the market, if we are to hear them at all, must demonstrate that 
market property rights will not get us where we want to go . . . as liberals. 
They must demonstrate why that is, and then they must demonstrate why 
an alternative set of property rights is to be preferred. But most importantly, 
they must, after defending such a set of rights, be able to close the argument 
as follows:
Would a liberal-democratic theory which embodied the new  concept of 
property still be in any significant sense a liberal theory? That depends, 
of course, on what you put into liberalism. If you insist that it must 
mean all the market freedoms . . . then clearly a political theory built 
around the new concept of property could not be called liberal. But if 
you take liberalism to be essentially an assertion of the right to all to full 
human development . . . then a political theory built around the new 
 conception of property is eminently qualified as liberal  theory . . . . [A] 
new, less historically inhibited, paradigm of property would not destroy 
but would liberate the essential liberal-democratic theory.67
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